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Abstract
We examine the trajectories of the real unit labour costs (RULCs) in a selec-
tion of Eurozone economies. Strong asymmetries in the convergence process of
the RULCs and its components —real wages, capital intensity, and technology—
are uncovered through decomposition and cluster analyses. In the last three
decades, the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) succeeded in re-
ducing their RULCs by more than their northern partners. With the exception of
Ireland, however, technological progress was weak; it was through capital intensi-
fication that periphery economies gained eﬃciency and competitiveness. Cluster
heterogeneity, and lack of robustness in cluster composition, is a reflection of the
diﬃculties in achieving real convergence and, by extension, nominal convergence.
We conclude by outlining technology as the key convergence factor, and call for
a renewed attention to real convergence indicators to strengthen the process of
European integration.
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1 Introduction
Nominal convergence versus real convergence. Can the former last in the absence of
the latter? Even if the Great Recession provides a negative answer, any state in the
European Union (EU) desiring to join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is
still subject to meet the Maastricht criteria. These criteria, which were designed to
ensure nominal convergence,1 entailed the implicit assumption that real convergence
would naturally follow. This presumption has miserably failed. Not only have these
countries lacked real convergence (in per capita GDP or unemployment rates), but
“the strengthened financial and real connections across the EMU countries, instead
of facilitating convergence (...) have magnified and mutually reinforced imbalances”
(Croci and Farina, 2012, p. 647).
Although it has become standard to refer to this slump as a ‘sovereign-debt crisis’,
our view is that the rise in public deficits and debts, more than a governments’ fail in
the management of national fiscal policies, is the consequence of diﬀerences in competi-
tiveness that generate real divergence and, therefore, growing account imbalances.2 Our
claim is that these imbalances, which were exacerbated with the EMU, were already
present in latent form. This is contrary to Sinn’s claim that "the lack of competitive-
ness was brought about by the euro itself" (Sinn, 2014, p. 1). They reflected, indeed, a
structural situation to which we implicitly refer when we divide the Eurozone into Core
and Periphery economies acknowledging that the first group is far more competitive
than the second one.3 Ultimately, this is what explains the real divergence we have
witnessed since the inception of the euro, and it is also at the root of the diﬀerential in-
tensity of the Great Recession in the Eurozone, once the sovereign-debt problem joined
in in 2010.
In this paper we take the real unit labour cost (RULC) as a relevant indicator
of competitiveness and, as such, as a driver of real convergence. We examine to what
extent our hypothesis of latent divergence forces holds by clustering the RULC according
1That is, convergence in prices: inflation (the price of goods and services), interest rates (the price
of money), and exchange rate stability (the price of currencies), apart from the commitment to keep
public sector accounts fairly balanced.
2The current euro crisis is considered by many observers as a crisis of government deficits and debt.
Nevertheless, even a casual look at the data raises many doubts regarding this point of view (Hein,
Truger and van Treeck, 2012). The ratio of gross government debt to GDP was only 25% in Ireland
and 36% in Spain, whereas Portugal used to have a smaller debt burden than Germany. This ratio
was far below 60%, the reference value of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in all three countries.
Nobody would have suspected any risk of government default in these countries.
3By Periphery countries we mean Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, while the Core
economies are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Germany is not
be considered, since disaggregated data is only available 1991 onwards due to the unification process.
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to its performance in a selection of 11 Eurozone economies. This variable is defined as
 = Real compensation per employee
Real labour productivity
 (1)
which allows our analysis to be performed on the RULC as a whole, but also on its two
main components.4
To have a first glance of the recent evolution in RULC, Table 1 shows the cumulated
evolution of the RULCs between 1979 and 2012. The first noticeable feature is the fall
in all economies, which ranges from 5% to 25%. This is a reflection of the systematic
eﬀort undertaken by these economies to become more competitive in a context of grow-
ing market pressures (acceleration in the globalization process and deeper European
integration).
It is also interesting to observe that the most intensive reductions have taken place
in the Eurozone periphery. Ireland takes the lead, with a fall of 25 percentage points
(pp) that is followed by some Club-Med countries —Greece, Portugal and Spain—, with
a fall around 20 pp. Then we find Italy (-15 pp.), which comes after Sweden.5 Thus,
maybe surprisingly, the sometimes called PIIG economies, appear as those that have
undergone the most intensive eﬀort in controlling their RULCs. At the other extreme
we observe continental European economies such as Finland and Belgium, with falls
below 10 pp.6
Table 1. RULC in selected Eurozone economies.
1979 2012 ∆∇ 1979 2012 ∆∇
Ireland 100.0 74.7 -25.3 Austria 100.0 87.1 -12.9
Spain 100.0 78.8 -21.2 Netherlands 100.0 87.7 -12.3
Portugal 100.0 80.0 -20.0 France 100.0 89.0 -11.0
Greece 100.0 81.8 -18.2 Finland 100.0 92.1 -7.9
Sweden 100.0 83.0 -17.0 Belgium 100.0 95.2 -4.8
Italy 100.0 85.1 -14.9
Source: Ameco Database.
Given these diﬀerences, dating back to the 1980s, we do not support the idea that the
inception of the Euro brought, inherently to the new monetary union, the development
4The RULCs can also be conceived as the Unit Labour Costs (ULC) deflated by prices ( ):
 =  where  =
Nominal compensation per employee
Real labour productivity

5For a comprehensive analysis of the structural changes undergone by the Swedish economy see
Freeman et al. (2010).
6Germany shows a fall of less than 12 pp, very close to the fall experienced by the Netherlands.
3
of unprecedented external imbalances. We rather see these imbalances as a reflection of
a latent structural problem that was exacerbated in the context of a single currency and
the impossibility of securing competitive gains through the prevailing, and convenient,
management of the exchange rate.
Our hypothesis is that the root of these imbalances is related to the specificities of
the growth model in the periphery and core European countries. This hypothesis gets
some initial support from a descriptive analysis showing that the periphery economies
have mainly relied on capital intensification to counterbalance their otherwise smaller
increase in wages. Increases in capital intensity are recognized to boost eﬃciency, but
we argue that this is an inferior strategy than the one followed by the core economies,
much more based on technological progress.
To check the validity of our hypothesis, our first target is to evaluate the existence
of clusters in the RULCs of some Eurozone economies. The second target is to assess
whether these clusters are driven by some of the components in which the RULCs can
be decomposed. These are real wages, capital intensity, and technology, the latter two
being the drivers of labour productivity and economic growth.
For the clusters to be examined, we first decompose the RULCs into these three
components and compute their simulated trajectories when either one or two of the
components take their actual values. This provides a first picture of the evolution of
the Eurozone economies, in terms of the path followed by their RULCs. Three groups
emerge. One with the Club-Med countries, which we classify as capital-intensity driven
economies; another one with technology-driven economies such as Belgium, Finland,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden; and a third one with balanced-growth driven
economies, where capital intensity and technology have similar explanatory weights.
Here we find Austria and France.
To evaluate the existence of clusters, we follow the methodology proposed by Phillips
and Sul (2007, 2009) in which diﬀerent convergence paths can be distinguished among
heterogenous economies involved in a convergence process. As explained in Section 4,
this heterogeneity is modelled through a nonlinear time varying factor model, which pro-
vides flexibility in idiosyncratic behaviour over time —convergence is a dynamic process—
and across section —since we examine a group of 11 economies.
We find these features particularly appealing to examine the convergence process
of the RULCs in the Eurozone. The main reason is that, although economies with
diﬀerent economic size and structure may appear to follow a similar development path,
they may converge at diﬀerent speeds and, therefore, may actually be at diﬀerent stages
of that same path. Moreover, although Phillips and Sul’s (2007, 2009) modelling allows
for idiosyncratic behaviour, it also retains some commonality across the panel. In
particular, it allows to check the convergence to a constant of the heterogeneous time
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varying idiosyncratic components, in which case panel convergence holds.
The cluster analysis involves the actual series of the RULCs and all the simulated
scenarios in which these costs are decomposed, each of them accounting for the influ-
ence of one, two or three of the RULCs components. We find a wide heterogeneity of
clusters both in number —diﬀerent scenarios deliver a diﬀerent number of clusters— and
composition —the composition of the clusters is not robust across simulations.
Given these results —the expected outcome after years of economic integration was,
ex-ante, convergence to a single cluster in all major macroeconomic dimensions—, we
question the strategy, originally endorsed by the Maastricht Treaty, of securing nominal
convergence without considering real convergence indicators. Rather, we suggest to
consider both simultaneously in order to safeguard, or at least strengthen, today’s hurt
process of European integration.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a decom-
position of the RULCs, which is applied to a broad selection of Eurozone economies in
Section 3. In Section 4, we explain the methodology we use for the cluster analysis.
Section 5 presents our findings before discussing their major implications in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Analytical decomposition
To study its evolution over time, the real unit labour costs (RULC) can be decomposed
in its relevant constituents.
We start by re-writing equation (1) as
 = Total real employment compensationReal output or

  (2)
where  denotes real wages or, in other words, the nominal wages deflated by prices
(). In turn,  is real output or the nominal output also deflected by prices
(). Under the assumption of a production function with capital , labour ,
and technology  as production factors, (nominal) output per employee  can be
expressed as:
() =  ∗(1−) ∗ (3)
where  is the time-varying labour income share.
Inserting (3) in (2) and diﬀerentiating, the growth rate of real unit labor costs
∆()
−1 can be decomposed as a function of the trajectories of real wages, capital
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intensity, and technological progress.
∆ ()
−1 ≈
µ∆()
−1 −
∆()
−1
¶
− (1− ) ∗ ∆()−1 −
∆()
−1  (4)
The first term in equation (4) accounts for the rise in the s arising from
increases in real compensation per employee. The second and third terms account,
respectively, for the fall in the  resulting from growing capital intensity and
quicker technological progress. It is important to note that these two terms —(1− ) ∗
∆()
−1 and
∆()
−1 — are the driving forces of labour productivity, as written in equation
(1), and, hence, of economic growth.
Following this decomposition, Table 2 shows the three simulated scenarios that can
be computed (we call them Simulations 1, 4 and 7, because new scenarios in between are
added below, in Table 7). In Simulation 1, the RULCs only respond to changes in real
wages (there is no progress in either capital deepening nor in technological change).
In Simulation 4, they respond to real wages and capital intensity (and there is no
technological progress). In Simulation 7, the three components are taken into account
and the resulting simulation can be interpretted as the overall fit of our decomposition
to the actual data.
Table 2. Simulated RULCs.
∆−1 (1− ) ∆−1 ∆−1 Outcome
Simulation 1 X − − 1 in the absence of capital
intensity and TFP.
Simulation 4 X X − 4 in the absence of
TFP.
Simulation 7 X X X 7 accounted for by the
three components (overall fit).
Note: See Table 7, where more scenarios are defined.
3 Empirical decomposition
3.1 Data
We use annual data obtained from the macro-economic database of the European Com-
mission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Aﬀairs (DG ECFIN). Our
sample period runs from 1980 to 2012. Table 3 presents the variables used, together
with the corresponding codes in the Ameco Database.
Figure A1 in the Appendix compares the actual growth rates of the RULCs with
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those obtained from the decomposition proposed in equation (4). One relevant feature of
this decomposition is the existence of non-negligible diﬀerences between the actual and
the simulated trajectories of the RULCs in the 1960s and the 1970s. In levels, these
diﬀerences end up producing significant discrepancies which would blur the picture
obtained with the decomposition analysis. This is the reason why we have excluded
these two decades and decided to depart in 1979 and focus on the changes occurred in
the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. On one side, this still give us enough degrees of freedom
to safely conduct the cluster exercise. On the other side, this restricts the analysis to
the aftermath of the oil price shocks and excludes noise from the structural break that
these shocks caused on all advanced economies.
Table 3. Definitions and codes.
Variable Notation Code
Real unit labour cost  QLCD
Nominal compensation per employee  HWCDW
Labour income share  ALCD
Net capital stock at constant prices per person employed  RKNDE
Total Factor Productivity  ZVGDF
Price deflator for Gross Domestic Product at market prices  PVGD
Note: the Codes correspond to Ameco Database variables.
3.2 Evolution by components
Table 4 shows the evolution of the RULCs (as in Table 1) and each of its components
up to 2012 departing from an index value 100 corresponding to 1979. As we know from
Table 1, the RULCs have fallen relatively more in the periphery economies than in the
non-periphery ones. They have fallen by 19.9 percent, on average, in Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which is almost twofold the 10.6 percent fall achieved, on
average, by the others.
The larger reduction in the overall RULC index in the periphery coincides with a
smaller increase in wages (44.5% vs. 51.7%, respectively, each of the two areas) and a
substantial larger increase in the capital intensity component (37.7 vs. 20.8 percent).
In contrast, the evolution of the TFP component in the Core economies has been much
more dynamic, showing an average increase of 38.9 percent, in clear contrast with the
17.8 percent rise observed in the Mediterranean ones. Ireland is excluded from this last
calculation, as it has been a clear exception with an important cumulative growth both
in capital intensity and, especially, in TFP with a 89.6 percent increase.
Beyond the identification of these two groups, a further crucial result is that in none
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of these economies wages have progressed much beyond their sustainable growth. By
sustainable growth we mean one that is consistent with the progress of technology.
Indeed, following any standard growth model, the reference wage growth would
be set according to technological change so as to ensure a long-run balanced growth
path. Denoting  as the growth rate of technology,  as the growth rate of capital
accumulation (per employee), and  the growth rate of wages, a balanced growth path
would satisfy:
 =  =  (5)
On this account it is worthwhile noting that the evolution of the periphery economies
since the end of the 1970s is, in general, closer to the above standard theoretical rule.
With the exception of Portugal, wages in these countries have evolved closer to the
levels granted by technological progress than in most non-periphery countries. But this
is not the only significant trait. It can also be observed that capital intensity has also
progressed more, relative to technology, in the periphery (with the exception of Ireland)
than in the non-periphery economies.
Table 4. RULCs and components: index 100 = 1979 and values in 2012.
1979 Values in 2012
∆−1
∆−1
(I )
(1− ) ∆−1
(II )
∆−1
(III )
()
()
()
()
Periphery
Greece 100.0 81.8 104.7 129.5 100.2 104% 129%
Ireland 100.0 74.7 197.2 138.6 189.6 104% 73%
Italy 100.0 85.1 122.7 125.5 116.5 105% 108%
Portugal 100.0 80.0 169.5 154.9 137.6 123% 113%
Spain 100.0 78.8 128.3 139.8 116.9 110% 120%
Average 100.0 80.1 144.5 137.7 132.2 109% 109%
Non-periphery
Austria 100.0 87.1 152.4 129.7 133.9 114% 97%
Belgium 100.0 95.2 148.3 118.0 129.4 115% 91%
Finland 100.0 92.1 182.3 120.4 159.8 114% 75%
France 100.0 89.0 137.9 126.7 122.9 112% 103%
Netherlands 100.0 87.7 136.3 115.6 132.8 103% 87%
Sweden 100.0 83.0 153.9 123.5 149.4 103% 83%
Average 100.0 89.4 151.7 120.8 138.9 109% 88%
Source: Own decomposition based on oﬃcial European Commission data (Ameco Database).
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From these results, we draw the following preliminary conclusions. First, the rela-
tive trajectories of wages and capital intensity uncover the two channels by which the
periphery countries have succeeded in reducing the RULCs by far more than the non-
periphery ones. Second, we hypothesize that the problem underlying the lack of real
convergence is not originated in the labour market but, rather, in the diﬀerent speed
of technological progress, which is what eﬀectively leads wage setting and the capital
accumulation process.
In addition, because the evaluation of these ratios is silent on the relative magnitude
of each component’s influence on the RULCs, we next look at the detailed contribution
of each of these components to the evolution of the RULCs.
3.3 Scenarios
Figures 1, 2 and 3 group the 11 Eurozone economies considered according to the in-
tensity at which the growth drivers —capital intensity and technological progress— have
counterbalanced the rise in the RULCs stemming from real wage growth.
Figure 1. Capital-intensity driven economies.
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Source: Own decomposition based on oﬃcial European Commission data (Ameco Database).
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The black line depicts the actual trajectory, which is closely tracked by the line in
green resulting from Simulation 7 in Table 2 (i.e., the one with the three components
providing the overall fit of the decomposition). This is an indication that the decom-
position analysis provides a faithful account of the incidence of each component in the
aggregate evolution of the RULCs.
Figure 2. Technology driven economies.
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Source: Own decomposition based on oﬃcial European Commission data (Ameco Database).
The blue line accounts for the upward eﬀect that the growth in real wages exert,
while the red line incorporates (on top of the eﬀect of the growth in real wages) the
downward influence of capital intensity. In this way, the distance in 2012 between the
10
blue and the red lines is an indication of the cumulated counterbalancing eﬀect of capital
intensity on the RULCs since 1979, while the distance between the red and green lines
is an indication of the incidence of technological progress.
As it is the case for the countries plotted in Figure 1, proximity of the red and green
lines is an indication that technological progress has been weak in last decades. This is
the reason why these economies are grouped under the label of capital intensity driven
economies.
In turn, in the economies plotted in Figure 2, the cumulative impact of technological
progress is much wider and explain a much larger proportion than capital intensity of
the shift from the RULCs when real wages are the only driving force to the actual lower
value they take in 2012. These are, therefore, the group of technology driven economies
with regard to the path followed by their RULCs.
Then in Figure 3 we have the two balanced driven economies in the sense that nei-
ther capital intensity nor technological progress dominate in explaining the downward
trajectory of the RULCs once accounted for the rise in real wages.
Figure 3. Balanced driven economies.
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Source: Own decomposition based on oﬃcial European Commission data (Ameco Database).
Table 5 provides more detailed information on the precise values of the RULCs under
the scenarios considered. The first block of columns provides the final values taken by
the RULCs under the diﬀerent scenarios considered in Table 2 and plotted in Figures
1 to 3 (we call them A, B, and C). Note that the value in C, resulting from simulation
7, is very close to the actual values of the RULCs in 2012 (in first column of Table 4).
The second block exploits this information to obtain the change in the RULCs due
to the evolution of real wages (=A-100, where 100 is the departing index value), of
capital intensity (=B-A), and technological progress (=C-B). It can be observed that,
with the exception of Portugal, the Club-Med economies experienced relatively mild
increases in the RULCs in response to real wages —below 30 percentage points. On
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the contrary, in the rest of economies this value was above 30 percentage points. This
contrasted patterns is a reflection of diﬀerences in the progress of labour productivity.
Table 5. RULCs and components.
Simulations Changes explained by: % growth drivers*
S1 S4 S7  (1− ) 
(A) (B) (C) (A-100) (B-A) (C-B)
(B-A)
(A-C)
(C-B)
(A-C)
Capital-intensity driven gains in RULCs
Greece 104.7 80.3 79.7 4.7 -24.4 -0.7 97.4 2.6
Italy 122.7 97.8 83.5 22.7 -25.0 -14.3 63.6 36.4
Portugal 169.5 109.4 79.3 69.5 -60.1 -30.1 66.7 33.3
Spain 128.3 91.7 78.1 28.3 -36.6 -13.6 73.0 27.0
Technology driven gains in RULCs
Belgium 148.3 125.8 96.9 48.3 -22.4 -28.9 43.7 56.3
Finland 182.3 151.6 93.2 82.3 -30.7 -58.3 34.5 65.5
Ireland 197.2 142.5 73.6 97.2 -54.7 -68.9 44.3 55.7
Netherlands 136.3 118.0 88.3 36.3 -18.3 -29.7 38.2 61.8
Sweden 153.9 124.6 82.8 53.9 -29.3 -41.7 41.2 58.8
Balanced driven gains in RULCs
Austria 152.4 117.6 87.4 52.4 -34.8 -30.2 53.5 46.5
France 137.9 109.0 88.3 37.9 -29.0 -20.6 58.4 41.6
Notes: S1, S4 and S7 correspond to Simulations 1, 4, and 7, as defined in Table 2; *: indicates the relative share
of capital intensity and technological progress on the overall downward impact of these growth drivers on RULCs.
Source: Own decomposition based on oﬃcial European Commission data (Ameco Database).
The sources of these diﬀerences can be assessed by looking at the contributions of
the two growth drivers, capital intensity and technological change.7 On this account,
no clear pattern can be perceived when looking at the role played by capital intensity in
percentage point changes. In particular, with the exception of Portugal, the rest of the
Club-Med countries have values between -24 and -37 pp, whereas (with the exception of
Ireland), the rest of economies have values between -18 and -35. There is, therefore, a
7Note that the addition of the values in the second block of columns gives essentially the same
information than Simulation 7 (the C column). In the case of Greece, for example, 4.7-(-24.4)-(-0.7)=-
20.3, which is the fall in the RULC explained by our decomposition analysis (from 100 to 79.7, which
is the value in the C column).
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relatively homogeneous impact of the progress in capital accumulation on the reduction
of the RULCs in the late decades across Eurozone countries.
The main diﬀerence, in this context, can be found in the contribution of technological
progress to the fall of these costs, which has been very poor in the Club-Med economies
(bar Portugal), but large in the other ones (bar France, which is in between the two
groups and, on this respect, resembles its Mediterranean neighbours). This can be easily
seen through the third block of columns in Table 5, where information is provided on
the relative share of capital intensity and technological progress in explaining the overall
downward contribution of these growth drivers to the fall of the RULCs.
In the Club-Med economies, the fall in RULCs have been mainly driven by progress
in capital intensity which accounts, at least, for 66.3% of the fall as in Italy. This leaves
technological progress to account, on average in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, for a third
of the fall in the RULCs. Greece is an extreme case where the contribution of TFP has
been almost non-existent.
Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden have in common a con-
tribution of TFP which is explains at least 55% of the fall, and reaches two thirds in
Ireland. This the group of economies with technology driven gains in RULCs.
Finally, Austria and France take an intermediate position with a balanced contribu-
tion of the growth drivers to the fall in RULCs. The capital intensity share is around
55%, and thus significantly lower than in the Club-Med economies, while the share of
technological progress is around 45%, and thus significantly lower than in the Nordic
and Continental European countries.
From this analysis, we conclude that diﬀerences in the speed of technological progress
is a major determinant of the unlike evolution of the RULCs in the Eurozone countries.
Note that this conclusion is endorsed by the prediction, from any standard neoclassical
growth model, that technology is the key growth driver and, hence, the critical factor
allowing for capital accumulation and wage growth in the long-run. To confirm this
finding, we now turn to a cluster analysis seeking to classify these economies into
significantly homogeneous groups according to the individual and joint influence of
the RULCs components.
4 Cluster analysis
The panel data model by Phillips and Sul (2007) has been proposed to represent the
behavior of economies in transition allowing for diﬀerent convergence paths with het-
erogeneous individuals. Heterogeneity is formulated as a nonlinear time varying factor
model which provides flexibility in idiosyncratic behaviour over time and across sec-
tion. These features of the model are very appealing in the case of convergence in the
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euro zone. Countries with diﬀerent economic size and structure may appear to follow a
similar development path but at diﬀerent speeds so that they are currently at diﬀerent
stages on that path. The eﬀect on technological and capital accumulation caused by
the diﬀerent economic policies in diﬀerent countries may also be important to explain
diﬀerent speed of convergence. The model allows for idiosyncratic behaviour and also
retains some commonality across the panel meaning that when the heterogeneous time
varying idiosyncratic components converge over time to a constant, panel convergence
holds.
The starting point of the test is a simple factor model:
 =  +  (6)
where  measures the idiosyncratic distance between some common factor  and the
systematic part of . This model seeks to capture the evolution on the individual
 in relation to  by means of its two idiosyncratic elements, that is, the systematic
element  and the error . Phillips and Sul (2007) modified this initial model by
allowing the systematic idiosyncratic element to evolve over time, thereby accommo-
dating heterogeneous agent behavior and evolution within that behavior by means of
a time-varying factor-loading coeﬃcient . Furthermore, they allow  to have a ran-
dom component, which absorbs  in equation (6) and allows for possible convergence
behavior in  over time in relation to the common factor . The new model has the
following time varying representation:
 =  (7)
The time varying representation in (7) can be used to separate common from idio-
syncratic components in the traditional decomposition of panel data:
 =  +  (8)
where  embodies systematic components, including permanent components that give
rise to cross section dependence, and  represents a transitory component. Transfor-
mation of equation (8) to equation (7) is given by:
 =
µ + 

¶
=  (9)
for all  and . In this way,  is decomposed in a single common component  and a
idiosyncratic one , both being time-varying.
The simple econometric representation in (7) can be used to analyze growth conver-
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gence by testing whether the factor loadings  converge. Phillips and Sul (2009) pro-
posed a modification of the neoclassical growth model so that technological growth rates
diﬀer across and over time and are endogenously determined. To account for temporal
and transitional heterogeneity, Phillips and Sul (2009) introduced time-heterogeneous
technology by allowing technological progress, , to follow a path of the form  =
0. Under this heterogeneous technology the individual transition path of log per
capita real income,  , evolves as:
log  = log ˜∗ + log0 + [log ˜0 − log ˜∗ ]− +  (10)
where ˜0 and ˜∗ denote initial and steady-state levels of eﬀective log per capita real
income and  is a time-varying speed of adjustment.
Equation (10) can be expressed in the form of equation (7):
log  = log ˜∗ + log0 + [log ˜0 − log ˜∗ ]− +  =  +  =  (11)
where  is presumed to have some elements that are common across countries so
that countries share a common growth component, . This common component can
represent commonly available world technology such as the industrial and scientific
revolutions and internet technology. Thus, the dynamic factor formulation  involves
the growth component  that is common across countries and individual transition
factors  which measures the transition path of an economy to a common steady-
state growth path determined by . During transition,  depends on the speed of
convergence parameter , the rate of technological progress parameter  and the
initial technical endowment and steady state levels through the parameter  (Phillips
and Sul, 2009, p. 1158).
Phillips and Sul (2007) proposed to model the transition elements  by the con-
struction of a relative measure of the transition coeﬃcients:
 = 1

P
=1
=

1

P
=1 
 (12)
which measures the loading coeﬃcient  in relation to the panel. The variable 
is called the relative transition path, and traces out an individual trajectory for each
 relative to the panel average. So,  measures region ’s relative departure from
the common steady-state growth path . When there is a common limiting transition
behavior across regions, we have  =  across , and when there is ultimate growth
convergence then  −→ 1 for all  as  −→∞.
Next, Phillips and Sul (2007) construct the cross-sectional mean square transition
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diﬀerential 1 where:
 = 1
X
=1
³
ˆ − 1
´2
(13)
and measures the distance of the panel from the common limit.
To formulate a null hypothesis of growth convergence, the authors proposed a semi-
parametric model for the time-varying behavior of  as follows:
 =  +  ()−1 − (14)
where  is fixed,   0,  is i.i.d. (0 1) across  but is weakly dependent on , and
() is a slowly varying function for which () tends to infinity as  also goes to infinity.
Following Phillips and Sul (2007) the () function is assumed to be log . In turn, 
introduces time-varying and region-specific components to the model. The size of 
determines the behavior (convergence or divergence) of . This formulation ensures
convergence of the parameter of interest for all  ≥ 0, which is the null hypothesis of
interest since  =  as  −→ ∞. Furthermore, if this hypothesis holds and  = 
for  6= , the specification in (14) still allows for transitional periods in which  6= ,
thereby incorporating the interesting possibility of transitional heterogeneity or even
transitional divergence across . Thus, the null hypothesis of convergence can be written
as:
0 :  =  and  ≥ 0 (15)
while the alternative is either:
 :  =  for all  with   0 (16)
or
 :  6=  for some  with  ≥ 0, or  ≤ 0 (17)
The alternative hypothesis includes divergence, as in (16) and (17), but can also con-
sider club convergence. For example, if there are two convergent clubs, the alternative
is:
 :  → { 1 and  ≥ 0 if  ∈ 12 and  ≥ 0if  ∈ 2  (18)
where  stands for an specific club.
Phillips and Sul (2007) show that these hypotheses can be statistically tested by
means of the following ‘log ’ regression model:
log(1)− 2 [log ()] = +  log () +  (19)
16
for  = [ ]  [ ] + 1   with some   0. Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest  = 03
based on their simulation experiments.
The key parameter of the convergence test  is related with . Indeed, Phillips and
Sul (2007) showed that the fitted value of log  is ˜ = 2˜ where ˜ is the estimated value
of  under the null. In this method, rejection of the null for the whole panel does not
imply that there is not convergence, since it is possible to test, by means of an algorithm,
whether there are clubs or clusters of convergence. Hence, it is possible to test the
hypothesis of convergence for diﬀerent group of countries, and identify commonalities
within a panel of countries.
The regression test of convergence in (19) is made up of three stages (Phillips and
Sul, 2007, p.1788). In the first step, the cross-sectional variance (1) ratio is con-
structed, and then in the second step the conventional robust  statistic, ˜, for the
coeﬃcient ˆ is computed using (19). Finally, in the third step, an autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity robust one-side  test of the inequality null hypothesis  ≥ 0 is ap-
plied using the estimated coeﬃcient ˆ and HAC standard errors. At the 5\% percent
level, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected if the statistic has a value below
-1.65.
However, the novel aspect of this approach is that convergence patterns within
groups can be examined using log  regressions, that is, the existence of club convergence
and then clustering. This fact is particularly relevant since the rejection of the null
of convergence does not necessarily imply divergence, since diﬀerent scenarios can be
met, such as separate points of equilibrium or steady-state growth paths, as well as
convergence clusters and divergent regions in the full panel. The existence of club
convergence raises an important concern, that is, how to identify the regions that belong
to each cluster. In this regard, Phillip and Sul (2007) suggested the following method.
In the first step, individuals in the panel must be ordered according to the last third
observations in the panel. In the second step, the so-called ‘core group’, , should be
identified by selecting the first  highest individuals in the panel to form the subgroup
 for some    ≥ 2, and then the log  regression is run and the convergence test
statistic () is obtained for this subgroup. Then, the core group size ∗ is chosen by
maximizing  over  according to the criterion:
∗ = argmax {} , subject to min {}  −165
The latter condition ensures that the null hypothesis of convergence is supported for
each . The rule for classifying the groups of regions into clubs is straightforward. For
example, if all the regions belong to the same group, then the size of the club will be  .
In contrast, if there are regions that do not belong to that group, the clusters will have a
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size lower than  . More formally, this implies that if the condition min {}  −165 is
not held for  = 2, then the highest individual in can be dropped from each subgroup
and new subgroups are created. This process is repeated as many times as necessary
until the condition is satisfied. If at the end of this process there are subgroups that
have been created (said to be club convergent), but there are others that do not satisfy
the condition, then it is said that those individuals diverge.
The convergence approach by Phillips and Sul (2007) presents clear advantages.
First, it is a test for relative convergence as it measures convergence to some cross-
sectional average in contrast to the concept of level convergence analyzed by Bernard
and Durlauf (1995). Second, this approach outperforms the standard panel unit root
tests since in the latter case  −  may retain nonstationary characteristics even
though the convergence condition holds, in other words, panel unit root test may clas-
sify the diﬀerence between gradually converging series as non-stationary. As a further
problem, a mixture of stationary and non-stationary series in the panel may bias re-
sults. Moreover, test results are sometimes not particularly robust. In contrast, the
Phillips and Sul (2007) test does not depend on particular assumption concerning trend
stationarity or stochastic nonstationarity of the variables to be tested.
5 Clusters in the RULCs and its components
Our cluster analysis involves the evaluation of several scenarios. The first one is the
analysis on the actual trajectory of the RULCs, which is followed by the analysis on
the seven simulated trajectories of the RULCs presented in Table 6. In Simulations
1, 2 and 3, the RULCs only respond to changes in one of the components. These
are, respectively, real wages (there is no progress in either capital deepening nor in
technical change), capital intensity (there is no growth in real wages nor in TFP), and
technological change (real wages and capital intensity do not change). In simulations
4, 5 and 6, RULCs respond to two out of the three components. As noted before,
in the first of these, real wages and capital intensity (but not technological progress)
are taken into account, in the second one (Simulation 5) real wages and TFP (but not
capital intensity) are considered, whereas Simulation 6 assumes no growth in real wages.
Simulation 7 takes into account the influence of the three components and accounts for
the overall fit of the decomposition.
Detailed information on the results of the cluster analysis for each of these sce-
narios is presented in Appendix 2. Table 7 summarizes the outcome of this analysis
when applied to the scenarios described in Table 6. Regarding the actual values of
the RULCs, our results uncover the existence of two groups, one comprising Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, and the Netherlands belonging to the continental Europe,
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and another one comprising the so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and
Spain) plus Sweden. The PIIGS group is characterised by structural diﬃculties to
compete internationally, and a regular use of the exchange rate —in the pre-EMU era—
to compensate for their positive inflation diﬀerentials with respect to their main trade
partners. Interesting enough, this was also the case of Sweden up to 1990 (see Freeman
et al., 2010).
Note that these results are consistent with our decomposition analysis. The first
cluster includes three economies with technology-driven gains in the RULCs, plus the
group with balanced driven gains, while the second cluster incorporates the four coun-
tries characterized by capital-intensity driven gains. This second cluster includes, in
addition, Ireland and Sweden.
Table 6. RULCs: actual and simulated.
∆
−1
∆−1 (1− ) ∆−1 ∆−1 Outcome
Actual X − − − Clusters on actual aggregate data.
Simulation 1 − X − − 1 in the absence of capital
intensity and TFP.
Simulation 2 − − X − 2 in the absence of real
wages and TFP.
Simulation 3 − − − X 3 in the absence of real
wages and capital intensity.
Simulation 4 − X X − 4 in the absence of TFP.
Simulation 5 − X − X 5 in the absence of
capital intensity.
Simulation 6 − − X X 6 in the absence of real
real wages.
Simulation 7 − X X X 7 accounted for by the
three components (overall fit).
Regarding Simulation 1, the first group identified in the cluster analysis puts to-
gether Finland, Ireland, and Portugal. This should come as no surprise since these are
the economies that during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s have experienced, by far as shown
in Table 2, the largest growth in real wages. The second and third groups comprise, re-
spectively, Austria, Belgium and Sweden and, then, France and the Netherlands, while
the last one gathers Greece, Italy and Spain together.
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Table 7. Clusters.
Actual Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 6 Sim 7
Group 1
AU
BE
FI
FR
NT
FI
IR
PO
BE
FI
NT
FR
GR
IT
SP
FI
IR
BE
PO
AU
BE
FR
GR
IT
NT
PO
SP
AU
BE
FI
FR
NT
Group 2
GR
IR
IT
PO
SP
SW
AU
BE
SW
GR
IT
SW
AU
BE
NT
PO
AU
BE
NT
PO
SW
AU
FR
FI
GR
IR
IT
NT
SP
SW
FI
IR
SW
GR
IR
IT
PO
SP
SW
Group 3
FR
NT
AU
FR
FI
IR
SW
FR
GR
IT
SP
Group 4
GR
IT
SP
IR
PO
SP
The classification in terms of capital intensity (Simulation 2) delivers groups that
are not as diﬀerent, from one another, than those obtained from simulations 1 and
3. The reason is that, for real wages and TFP, there is much more dispersion in the
evolution of the countries, than for capital intensity (see Table 2).8 In any case, the
most remarkable feature regarding capital intensity, is that group 3 clearly identifies
Austria and France as conforming a group themselves, while group 1 comprises only
technology-driven economies (Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands).
The cluster analysis performed when TFP is the only variable allowed to aﬀect
the evolution of the RULCs (Simulation 3) provides useful complementary information
8More precisely, note that for real wages and TFP the countries with the smallest and biggest
growths are Greece and Ireland, with diﬀerences around 90 percentage points. In contrast, for capital
intensity the divergence across economies is in the much narrow range of 40 percentage points (between
115.6 in 2012 in the Netherlands and 154.9 in Portugal).
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which exploits wider diﬀerentials in the performance of the economies. Looking at the
clusters, it is worthwhile pointing out that the first group does fully coincide with one
of the clusters obtained from Simulation 4. The second and third ones, in turn, provide
a very close match. The only diﬀerence is that Sweden moves from the second group
(when both capital intensity and TFP are allowed to vary) to the third one (when only
TFP changes).
We interpret this close match as evidence that TFP is the strongest driver of labour
productivity and, as such, growth policies deserve great attention from policy makers.
This idea is consistent with the recent finding by Wierts et al. (2014) that the eﬀect
of the real exchange rate on exports in the Eurozone becomes smaller the higher the
share of high technology exports in total exports. Following this, specialisation in high
tech sectors pushes productivity and makes these economies less dependant of the real
eﬀective exchange rate which, in the absence of national currencies, is the relevant
variable to assess price competitiveness.
The contrast between the results under Simulations 1 and 3 virtually vanish in
Simulation 5, in which the RULCs are evaluated considering changes in wages (like in
Simulation 1) and TFP (as in Simulation 3). The first club joins Belgium and Portugal,
while a second one contains the rest of the economies although, in any case, we must
state that the diﬀerences between the two clubs are of minor order (recall that Belgium
and Portugal are the two countries where the ratio between wages and technology
growth has been the largest —even though very close to next economies in this ranking
in the Belgian case).
Simulation 6 examines the clusters when both capital intensity and technology, but
not wages, drive the evolution of the RULCs. This implies that the two sources of
labour productivity are considered together. Since wages are fixed as a function of
productivity, the less clubs we find, the more homogeneous will be wage growth in the
Eurozone.
This sixth scenario is the only one in which we find two clear clusters. On top of
this being the number of clusters obtained for the actual evolution of the RULCs, these
clubs have a salient feature. The first one contains the members of cluster 1 and 2 under
Simulation 3 (when technology was absent), while the second one exactly matches club
3 in Simulation 3. In other words, as opposed to capital intensity, technology seems to
be the fundamental driving force in the clustering of the countries and, therefore, in
the real convergence process.
This result is consistent with the predictions of standard growth theory. It intro-
duces some caveats, however, in the design of (common) economic policy towards which
we turn next.
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6 RULCs, economic convergence and external im-
balances
External imbalances are currently an issue of great concern. No so long ago, however,
they were mainly seen as a temporary counterpart of economic convergence.
In a seminal paper, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) argued that increased financial
integration should lead to a loosening of the relation between domestic savings and in-
vestment, as international capital markets could be used to finance savings-investment
imbalances. Accordingly, increasing current account imbalances should not be seen as
an issue of concern, but rather as the natural consequence of an improved interna-
tional (re)allocation of capital and, thus, as the resulting economic convergence across
countries.
The theory of intertemporal utility maximization provides a theoretical framework
to this line of thought. In the presence of integrated real and financial markets, less
developed countries attract foreign investment because of their higher expected pro-
ductivity of invested capital. At the same time, these economies should consume more
and save less in anticipation of higher income growth in the future. As a result, these
countries run current account deficits. Thus, diverging current accounts should be in-
terpreted as the consequence of a convergence process among countries with diﬀerent
levels of economic development. If this is the case, external imbalances should be tem-
porary and would not require government intervention. They would be automatically
oﬀset by changes in exchange rates, private investment and savings across countries
(Clarida, 2007, and Blanchard, 2007).
In spite of this rationalization, external imbalances are a recurrent feature of the
world economies with an outcome not always in line with the optimistic theoretical
prediction. Belke and Schnabl (2013) point to four waves of global imbalances. The
first one, between Japan and the US since the early 1980s, led to the Japanese ‘lost
decade’; the second one, between China and a group of East Asian economies, on one
side, and the US on the other, lead to the East Asian crisis; the third one was due to
the fast increase in the prices of oil and other raw materials, and caused large current
account deficits in the US and Europe (bar the northern European oil producers); the
fourth one has taken place in the Eurozone and has even threatened the European
integration process itself.
Moreover, the literature in this field is far from reaching a consensus. Departing from
the above theoretical framework, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) concluded that domes-
tic investment and savings decisions in the Eurozone are decoupled in the sense that
southern lower-income countries can extensively borrow from northern higher-income
countries leading to economic convergence between these groups. Similar conclusions
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are reached by Ahearne et al. (2007), who argued that capital flows within the euro
zone were moving as predicted by neoclassical theory and were strongly supportive of
the convergence hypothesis. On the contrary, Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008) and
Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) expressed concern about the sustainability of the
observed current account deficits in the southern Eurozone countries. Belke and Dreger
(2013) acknowledge that these deficits may be understood to be in line with the in-
tertemporal approach of the current account, but they also claim that catching up does
not oﬀer a full explanation, and point to relative government debt and competitiveness
as more relevant factors.
The study with the closest view to our analysis is the one by Holinski et al. (2012),
who argued that growing current account imbalances within the Eurozone reflect an
ongoing process of economic divergence rather than the expected convergence. The
diﬀerence between this study an ours lies in the roots of this divergence. Holinski et
al. (2012) concluded that the increasing current account deficits in the Periphery are
driven mainly by the decline in transfers and the increase in net factor payments. Excess
borrowing increases net foreign debt and subsequent interest payments, bringing these
countries to an unsustainable net foreign debt position. Our claim is that the ultimate
cause of this situation lies in the structural lack of real convergence experienced by
these economies in spite of the economic integration process.
In any case, the lack of full consistency between the economic convergence theory
and the growing external imbalances in the Eurozone is a research area that will deserve
further attention from the profession.
Our analysis has taken into account more than three decades of the recent eco-
nomic history. Those in which the European integration process consolidated along
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) set up in 1960 with Austria, Portugal,
and Sweden, and also Finland since 1961, among other countries, and the European
Economic Community (EEC) with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands since
the 1950s, and also Ireland (since 1973), Greece (1981), and Spain (1986), to which the
EFTA economies joined subsequently.
In a globalised world with deep economic integration, one could have expected a
strong enough process of economic convergence so as to deliver a unique cluster. Beyond
that, one could even envisage a situation in which this club would be the same for all
the scenarios considered, with technology leading the convergence in all major macro
variables.
It is clear, however, that the Eurozone economies are actually far from such theo-
retical prediction. Although we have verified that wages have grown in a sustainable
manner all around following technological progress, their evolution is very heteroge-
neous as a reflect of the variety of technological experiences. This is what we observe
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when clustering systematically the RULCs so as to account for the incidence of one or
two of the components that determine their trajectory.
The actual path of the RULCs delivers two clusters which, in broad-brush terms
coincide with the periphery and non-periphery Eurozone groups that have characterised
the Sovereign-Debt crisis in 2010-2013. However, when these economies are examined
according to the incidence of wages, capital intensity and technology on the RULCs,
a wide variety of clusters emerge. Four in the first two simulations in which only
wages or capital intensity aﬀect the RULCs (with a diﬀerent country-composition of
these four clusters), but three when only technology is allowed to change. Three in
the absence, only, of TFP changes, but two in the absence of capital intensity and real
wages influences (although these two are diﬀerent among them, and also relative to the
two clubs resulting from the aggregate analysis).
Beyond the detailed interpretation of these results provided in Section 5, there is an
all-encompassing crucial question: How is Europe supposed to be successful in achieving
nominal convergence (the one led by the Maastricht criteria in the 1990s), in the absence
of real convergence?
We believe that with lots of diﬃculties. The crucial role played by the growing
external imbalances in the onset of the Sovereign-Debt crisis is eloquent on this respect.9
Figure 4 plots the evolution of current account balances as percent of GDP and provides
intuitive support to the findings in Table 7. Figures 4a and 4b are revealing in showing,
on one side, the diﬃculties of the Periphery countries in avoiding current account deficits
and, on the other side, the more comfortable situation of the Core economies.
We were initially told that the European and Monetary Union would further facili-
tate economic integration (further with respect to the common market) by converging
nominally as a stepping stone towards real convergence. In this way, growth, techno-
logical and, ultimately, welfare gaps would be reduced and eventually closed. Taking a
short-run perspective, the recent evolution of growth, unemployment, and welfare has
been certainly unlike within Europe. And taking a 30 years long-run perspective, we
have shown wide disparities in the evolution of the RULCs, one key variable represen-
tative of the serious lack of real convergence.
Under this perspective, policy coordination at the European level (call it Maastricht
Treaty, Stability and Growth Pact, or Fiscal Compact) and national coordination of
European policies is more than ever a major challenge. Because this issue is much
beyond the scope of this particular analysis, let us focus on one particular example.
Would it be useful to embark on a process of unification of labour market legislation so
as to foster a Single European Labour Market?10 Our results call for a very cautious
9There has been much discussion on the role played by external imbalances in the current crisis,
both at the European level (Croci and Farina, 2012) and at the global level (Willett, 2012).
10Recall that the European Commissioner for Employment, László Andor, pointed in May 2013 to
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approach to this avenue. Although there is, of course, scope for changes in legislation
in all economies, the performance of the labour market cannot be isolated from the eco-
nomic performance of the countries. This is the reason why the prominent target should
be to foster technological convergence. Of course along the lines of the EU programme
Horizon 2020 seeking to enhance research and innovation, but going beyond that to
incorporate, in parallel, much more national coordination of industrial policies. This
has been, up to now, a relatively neglected area in the European process of economic
integration.
Figure 4. Current account balance.
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7 Conclusion
Were the Eurozone economies hiding structural diﬀerences in competitiveness through
a skillful management of the exchange rate? Could this strategy no longer be hidden
—and thus maintained— with the single currency, and then materialized in the form of
unprecedented external imbalances? The results of this paper point to positive answers
to these questions.
We have shown that the RULCs have fallen almost twice as much in the Periphery
than in the non-Periphery countries over the period 1979-2012. This is the outcome
the establishment of a Single European Labour Market as a "part of the EU’s recovery strategy” and
that some institutions (European Policy Centre, Institute for the Study of Labor) are devoting energy
to asses the potential costs and benefits of pursuing seriously this route.
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of a less expansionary wage growth process mainly counterbalanced through capital
intensity gains. On the contrary, Core Eurozone economies have experienced larger
rates of wage growth sustained through a much more dynamic process of technological
progress.
Which one is the best strategy? Although capital accumulation boosts growth and
productivity, technology is the right way to ensure stable long-run economic growth.
This would explain why, in spite of the PIIGS eﬀort to reduce their RULCs, they were
unable to converge to the Core Eurozone economies.
Last decades have witnessed a period of most intensive economic integration within
Europe. Real convergence, however, has not been achieved as ex-ante expected. In-
stead of finding a single cluster or, at least, a robust configuration of clubs within the
Eurozone, we have uncovered a variety of statistically significant clusters with, on top,
wide country-variation in their composition.
Cluster heterogeneity, and lack of robustness in cluster composition, would have
been such unexpected outcomes had the architects of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) been asked in 1989 Madrid’s summit whether this process would result,
25 years later, into significant real convergence.
On the contrary, there was a quick and intensive deterioration of the current account
balance in the PIGS since the mid 1990s, which accelerated since the inception of the
euro, and had a positive counterpart in the Core group current accounts. Our results
lead us to think that the EMU has not been the cause of the external imbalances, and
the resulting sovereign-debt crisis, in a context of closed financial markets. Rather, it
has boosted some structural divergencies that were already present in the growth model
of these economies.
Since these divergencies can be ascribed mainly to diﬀerent technological levels,
rather than to a wrong wage behaviour in the Periphery, internal devaluation policies
are not the solution to surpass the current situation in the Eurozone. These policies
have forced rebalancing of the external deficits, but they do not help convergence. And
the reason is the same we have heard many times when economies embark in external
devaluations: these are not genuine competitive gains, it is technology what matters.
Hence, looking retrospectively, the definition of the Maastricht criteria should have
been probably more balanced towards the inclusion of some real convergence indicators
to be fulfilled before joining the EMU. The extensive battery of indicators considered
in the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP) constitute a response to this void.11
113 year backward moving average of the current account balance as percent of GDP, with thresholds
of +6% and -4%; net international investment position as percent of GDP, with a threshold of -35%;
5 years percentage change of export market shares measured in values, with a threshold of -6%; 3
years percentage change in nominal unit labour cost, with thresholds of +9% for euroarea countries
and +12% for non-euroarea countries; 3 years percentage change of the real eﬀective exchange rates
based on HICP/CPI deflators, relative to 41 other industrial countries, with thresholds of -/+5% for
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We cannot abstain, however, to point out that this new set of indicative thresholds are
formulated as a surveillance mechanism, and not as convergence targets.12 We wonder,
in the current context, whether some real convergence indicators should also be targeted
to safeguard, or at least strengthen, the process of European integration.
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APPENDIX 1
Figure A1. Growth rates of the RULCs. Actual and simulated.
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Figure A1. ... continuation
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Note: Simulation based on the scenario ‘Simulation 7’ (as explained in Tables 2 and 6),
which is conducted for period 1960-2012.
Source: Decomposition based on oﬃcial European Commission data (Ameco Database).
APPENDIX 2
Table A2.1. Cluster analysis on the actual RULCs.
Overall convergence test:
−  − 
constant -0.158 -0.100
log  -0.832 -1.587
Sub-club convergence:
First convergence club: Second convergence club:
−  −  −  − 
constant -0.448 -0.533 constant -2.002 -0.483
log  -0.386 -1.380 log  -0.158 -0.114
Countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Finland, Netherlands. Portugal, Spain, Sweden.
Note: Since -stat-1.65, the second
club is indeed a convergent club.
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Table A2.2. Cluster analysis on the RULCs from Simulation 1.
Overall convergence test:
−  − 
constant 0.070 0.180
log  -1.750 -12.772
Sub-club convergence:
First convergence club: Sub club convergence:
−  −  −  − 
constant -4.798 -2.178 constant -0.128 -0.167
log  0.862 1.113 log  -1.446 -5.370
Countries: Ireland, Portugal, Finland. Note: Since -stat-1.65, we repeat the
clustering procedures
Second convergence club: Sub club convergence:
−  −  −  − 
constant -5.486 -2.606 constant -1.950 -1.508
log  1.228 1.661 log  -0.750 -1.650
Countries: Austria, Belgium, Sweden. Note: Since -stat-1.65, we repeat the
Since -stat-1.65, we repeat the clustering procedures
clustering procedures
Third convergence club: Fourth convergence club:
−  −  −  − 
constant -4.958 -2.313 constant -5.021 -1.906
log  1.071 1.423 log  0.614 0.664
Countries: France, Netherlands. Countries: Greece, Spain, Italy.
Note: Since -stat-1.65, the fourth
club is indeed a convergent club.
Note: Simulation 1 allows variations in wages, while capital intensity and TFP are fixed.
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Table A2.3. Cluster analysis on the RULCs from Simulation 2.
Overall convergence test:
−  − 
constant 1.278 8.413
log  -1.644 -30.469
Sub-club convergence:
First convergence club: Sub club convergence:
−  −  −  − 
constant -5.894 -12.890 constant 0.664 7.248
log  0.771 4.749 log  -1.358 -41.757
Countries: Belgium, Finland, Netherlands. Note: Since -stat-1.65, we repeat the
clustering procedures
Second convergence club: Sub club convergence:
−  −  −  − 
constant -4.368 -1.950 constant -0.836 -3.560
log  0.567 0.713 log  -0.928 -11.133
Countries: Greece, Italy, Sweden. Note: Since -stat-1.65, we repeat the
Since -stat-1.65, we repeat the clustering procedures
clustering procedures
Third convergence club: Fourth convergence club:
−  −  −  − 
constant -4.470 -2.862 constant -4.359 -6.101
log  0.322 0.581 log  0.185 0.729
Countries: Austria, France. Countries: Ireland, Portugal, Spain.
Note: Since -stat-1.65, the fourth
club is indeed a convergent club.
Note: Simulation 2 allows variations in capital intensity, while wages and TFP are fixed.
32
Table A2.4. Cluster analysis on the RULCs from Simulation 3.
Overall convergence test:
−  − 
constant -0.636 -2.560
log  -1.045 -11.859
Sub-club convergence:
First convergence club: Sub club convergence:
−  −  −  − 
constant -2.795 -1.435 constant -2.298 -3.475
log  0.625 0.904 log  -0.713 -3.039
Countries: Greece, France, Spain, Note: Since -stat-1.65, we repeat the
Italy. clustering procedures
Second convergence club: Third convergence club:
−  −  −  − 
constant -6.167 -4.609 constant -4.968 -6.289
log  1.703 3.587 log  0.352 1.255
Countries: Austria, Belgium, Netherlands. Countries: Finland, Ireland, Sweden.
Portugal. Note: Since -stat-1.65, the fourth
club is indeed a convergent club.
Note: Simulation 3 allows variations in TFP, while wages and capital intensity are fixed.
Table A2.5. Cluster analysis on the RULCs from Simulation 4.
Overall convergence test:
−  − 
constant 1.659 3.796
log  -1.798 -11.591
Sub-club convergence:
First convergence club: Sub club convergence:
−  −  −  − 
constant 4.760 0.530 constant -0.212 -0.324
log  -1.151 -0.361 log  -1.273 -5.498
Countries: Finland, Ireland. Note: Since -stat-1.65, we repeat the
clustering procedures
Second convergence club: Third convergence club:
−  −  −  − 
constant -1.667 -1.980 constant -0.759 -0.405
log  0.049 0.164 log  -0.768 -1.154
Countries: Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Countries: France, Greece, Italy, Spain.
Portugal, Sweden. Note: Since -stat-1.65, the third
club is indeed a convergent club.
Note: Simulation 4 allows variations in wages and capital intensity, while TFP is fixed.
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Table A2.6. Cluster analysis on the RULCs from Simulation 5.
Overall convergence test:
−  − 
constant -1.286 -3.535
log  -1.058 -8.765
Sub-club convergence:
First convergence club: Second convergence club:
−  −  −  − 
constant 12.514 5.716 constant -3.971 -7.645
log  -5.339 -7.353 log  -0.007 -0.040
Countries: Belgium, Portugal. Note: Since -stat-1.65, the second
club is indeed a convergent club.
Countries: Austria, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden.
Note: Simulation 5 allows variations in wages and TFP, while capital intensity is fixed.
Table A2.7. Cluster analysis on the RULCs from Simulation 6.
Overall convergence test:
−  − 
constant -0.500 -2.384
log  -1.488 -21.611
Sub-club convergence:
First convergence club: Sub club convergence:
−  −  −  − 
constant -4.278 -6.242 constant -0.720 -1.107
log  0.283 1.260 log  -1.417 -6.644
Countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Note: Since -stat-1.65, we repeat the
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. clustering procedures
Second convergence club:
−  − 
constant -6.562 -9.263
log  0.835 3.592
Countries: Finland, Ireland, Sweden.
Note: Since -stat-1.65, the second
club is indeed a convergent club.
Note: Simulation 6 allows variations in capital intensity and TFP, while wages are fixed.
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Table A2.8. Cluster analysis on the RULCs from Simulation 7.
Overall convergence test:
−  − 
constant -0.642 -0.585
log  -1.144 -3.172
Sub-club convergence:
First convergence club: Second convergence club:
−  −  −  − 
constant -1.962 -2.797 constant -0.633 -0.215
log  -0.282 -1.221 log  -1.206 -1.245
Countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Finland, Netherlands. Portugal, Spain, Sweden.
Note: Since -stat-1.65, the second
club is indeed a convergent club.
Note: Simulation 7 allows variations in wages, capital intensity, and TFP. It provides the overall fit.
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